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II. STU.DIES 
Approaches to Paul Ricoeur's 
Hermeneutics of Action 
British Hermeneutics and the Genesis 
of Empiricism 
Gary Shapiro 
In an essay of 1961, "The History of Philosophy and Historicity," Paul 
Ricoeur has suggested that the narratives which we construct of the 
history of philosophy tend either toward excessive integration or disinte-
gration. On the first alternative we tend to view the history of philosophy, 
or a segment of it, as a succession of systems understood from the perspec-
tive of that system closest to our own philosophical inclinations; on the 
second alternative we tend toward a dispersive attention tm,vard specific 
problems, thinkers, and texts. Neither approach is satisfying, but Ricoeur 
maintains that in the history of philosophy. as contrasted to other histori-
cal and narrative forms, we are forced toward either the integrative or the 
dispersive goal. Both tendencies represent a suppression of history. Yet the 
history of philosophy, like other histories. Ricoeur suggests, can disclose 
historicity, even in the paradoxical form of showing that in fact the 
events-thoughts, texts. philosophical careers-of which it is composed do 
not succeed in maintaining an absolute singularity or dissolving them-
selves into an absolute system: 
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history is history only to the extent that it has reached neither absolute dis-
course nor absolute singularity-to the extent that the meaning of it remains 
confused and entangled. Lived history is all that which happens prior to its 
decomposition and suppression by the system and singularity. 1 
Ricoeur suggests then that we will never reach either ultimate Hegelian 
systematicity nor Nietzschean difference in philosophical practice or in the 
history of philosophy, but that either can serve as a regulative idea for the 
philosopher. The philosophical historian of philosophy can only see the 
historicity of his subject matter by an awareness of both. 
In the spirit of these pointers from Ricoeur I want to look at some 
narrative tendencies within the history of philosophy that are relevant to 
the continuing confrontation and series of adjustments between philoso-
phical analysis as it has been practiced in the English speaking world and 
the hermeneutical tendencies within phenomenological and continental 
thought. Let us begin by noting that one way in which many philosophical 
projects acknowledge historicity rather than seeking an elusive universal 
system or an impossible individuality is through their concern with the 
discourse of others, especially as found in the canonical texts of a religious or 
literary tradition, or in those of philosophy itself. To be concerned with the 
other's texts requires an admission that one's own discourse is embedded 
in history and is not fully pliable to either of the two poles identified in 
Ricouer's analysis. In the re-examination of the history of philosophy that 
is taking place today in the light of such tendencies as the phenomenologi-
cal hermeneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur, Derrida's deconstruction of the 
text and Foucault's exploration of the tangled genealogies of knowledge 
and power, it may be useful to take another look at the hermeneutics which 
does not simply operate on the field of the history of philosophy but which 
is already part of that whose history we would narrate. 
T.W. Adorno raises the question of philosophy's relation to hermeneuti-
cal thought in an essay on Walter Benjamin. He observes that Benjamin 
distanced himself from what he.saw as philosophy by maintaining "a 
determined Alexandrianism," philosophizing in his own manner only by 
means of commenting on already existing texts. Here as elsewhere Adorno 
praises Benjamin's transvaluation of the notion of the sacred text, while 
regretting his neglect of many dimensions of traditional philosophy which 
might have given more power to his insights: 
For him philosophy consisted essentially in commentary and criticism ... The 
concern of philosophy with previously existent, codified doctrines is less foreign 














